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Western Assistance to Central and Eastern European Countries 
in Their Transition to Market Systems 
Introduction 
In November 1993, more than forty participants gathered at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, to discuss the challenges, 
opportunities, and failures of Western assistance for economic transformation in Russia. The 
participants, who responded to a call by the Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) 
Project at IIASA, consisted of international experts and policy-makers representing institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), Ministries of Economy and Finance of several countries, and the Bank 
of Russia, as well as other key figures in the world of multilateral aid and academia. This 
seminar was one in a series organized by the ETI Project dealing with the transition from 
centrally planned to a market economy in Russia. The Ford Foundation and the Pew 
Charitable Trusts have generously provided financial support for the seminar series. 
The particular topic of Western assistance was considered as a high priority item. We have 
now had enough experience with Western assistance that we can not only look back, but also 
look forward. The issues of primary concern include a lack of understanding on the part of 
both Eastern European nations and the West for the other side with respect to the 
prerequisites, regulations, and requirements governing the process on the one hand and the 
scope and character of the aid and assistance required on the other. Furthermore, while there 
is some belief that the West could offer more and especially more timely assistance, Russia 
and other East European states do not, in fact, exhaust all the potential sources of assistance, 
especially in terms of efficiency, for a variety of reasons. 
In many ways, this report exposes the complexities associated with Western assistance to East 
Europe. Few points can boast universal agreement: all donors (whether international 
organizations, financial multilaterals, or advisors from academia West or East) and recipients 
view the issues from slightly different perspectives. Each begins with a different 
understanding of what was and a different goal for what ought to be. The report also 
attempts to convey the most promising aspect of the seminar: the willingness of experts to 
discuss sensitive issues in an effort to improve the procedures and requirements for giving 
and receiving foreign assistance. 
The expository form of presentation has been chosen for this report in order to present a 
succinct, cohesive, and objective account of the information, pertinent arguments, personal 
experiences, and discussions offered at the meeting. The author of this report and the 
organizers of the seminar, all members of the ETI Project, wish to thank the participants for 
their valuable contributions. A full list of names and affiliations is given in the appendix, as 
well as the agenda of the seminar. 
General Characteristics of Foreign Assistance 
The following provides some background against which current foreign assistance has been 
given, partly to show that some of the frustrations experienced on both sides are not new, 
going back to the time of Ancient Greece, and perhaps setting the backdrop for the discussion 
identifying those issues that are distinctively new. 
Foreign aid has a long history. Over the centuries, most aid was closely associated with 
national security, buying allies or neutralizing adversaries. Nevertheless, there is a generally 
novel component to foreign assistance as it has come to the forefront of international policy 
in the post-World War I1 era. In the United States, a leading nation in this activity, foreign 
assistance has become an integral ongoing part of US foreign policy, no longer specifically 
related to security, since President Truman came to office in 1949 and may have influenced 
this modem style. Before this new era, foreign aid was of a sporadic and fixed temporary 
nature, like the Marshall Plan. More recently, foreign aid programs have become a part of 
OECD governments' structures and they give aid on a routine, regular basis. The novelty 
of the last few decades is that the giving of foreign assistance has become an integral part of 
the international behavior of rich countries and has now become institutionalized. 
The IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) were 
established in 1944 but neither was designed to give what we now call "concessional aid" 
(offering capital on very preferable terms). Both were designed to assist countries in 
difficulty: in the case of the IMF short term difficulty and in the case of the World Bank to 
mediate between private capital markets and countries reconstructing first and subsequently 
developing. The increase in concessional aid can be attributed to the imperfect nature of 
international capital markets and the lack of access to capital and to capital markets for 
countries that are most in need of it, as in the case of the republics of the former Soviet 
Union. Many international financial institutions as the World Bank, IMF, EBRD, and others 
are working with a contradiction embedded in their charters: they are to lend aid on 
essentially a non-market basis (i.e., when commercial banks would not lend), but are 
simultaneously required to act like sound bankers. For some extremely difficult and sensitive 
lending issues, as in the case of Russia, some international financing agencies (like the IMF) 
are peculiarly illadapted to the circumstances and to dealing with the arising problems. For 
instance, it is not within the Fund's practice to initiate the provision of aid. Someone else 
or group must thus take the initiative: in the case of Russia, for example, it should be the 
recipient itself and the G7.l 
Donors and recipients of foreign assistance are motivated by numerous but different interests. 
The fundamental interest of recipients is fairly obvious: to obtain additional resources (at as 
reasonable a cost as possible) to compensate their scarcity in that particular nation. The 
motivation of donors is much more complicated. Historically security has been a key factor, 
and it continues to be so even today. In addition, aid has been seen as a vehicle of export 
promotion and a channel for extending influence (culture, language, etc.) of the donor 
country. Straight-forward altruism also plays an increasing role in aid programs: important 
The G7 countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. 
vocal segments of the population feel that rich countries have a duty and obligation to help 
countries less well off. The latter is something that has primarily arisen in the post-WWII 
era when aid has become ongoing government policy as a kind of global redistribution and 
not just available in emergency situations. 
Aid is almost always conditional. The major exception is where the principle motivation is 
promoting exports, although this is tied in its own way. Otherwise, the donor country wants 
to be sure that the aid is being used plausibly to serve its objectives which may not be entirely 
well-articulated and may be diverse or even conflicting. Particularly in democratic countries, 
an argument has to be put to the parliaments and to the publics that the aid is serving its 
purpose and is conditional on policies. This is intrinsically a source of tension between the 
donor and recipient countries. Nevertheless, the positive part of conditionality is that when 
it works it creates a new form of coalition between the outside advisors and the recipient 
governments which are then to more likely have a longer term devotion to the policy 
implementations as part of the conditionality. The credibility of the recipients generated in 
this manner is also more likely to secure the continuous flow nature of foreign assistance. 
The recipients must make the political judgements with respect to what is achievable and what 
is not in the country in question; these nations should not allow themselves to be badgered 
by foreign advisors into taking actions which may be politically unwise. Foreigners just do 
not have the feeling that is necessary for making refined judgements about the behavioral 
responses and the political reactions to policies. But the countries can certainly benefit from 
the information that foreign advisors give on what has worked or not worked in other 
countries and why, and they should feel free not to accept the foreign aid as there is no 
obligation to do so. It is in the nature of democracy, the style of government adopted by the 
new recipient countries of Eastern Europe, that policy decisions take time and this can delay 
the granting of conditional assistance, causing conflicts regarding the timeliness of aid. 
There are different kinds of conditionality, though conventional macroeconomic conditionality 
to do with fiscal and monetary policies can result in considerable economic damage. For 
example in Eastern Europe, the way in which some of the interpretation of fiscal as opposed 
to monetary conditionality deters the transforming economies from undertaking certain types 
of desirable financial reforms and restructuring. In particular, those that are involved in the 
recognition of the bad assets on the balance sheets of the banks which should be replaced by 
explicit claims, probably in the form of a bond issued by the government. This then causes 
a subsequent series of problems that involve the retention of the soft budget constraint for 
enterprises and banks in these countries and just further delays the imposition of financial 
discipline. 
The history of foreign aid over the last 30-40 years has resulted in many failures in the sense 
that no possible case can be made ex-post that the aid has served the interest of the donor 
countries and has secured the consequences expected ex-ante. As long as a recipient country 
had one particular project which was of funding character, it was very difficult to determine 
whether the foreign aid actually went in full to the designated activity. However, there were 
clearly some outstanding successes such as the Marshall Plan and the Aid Program for South 
Korea. Yet even with respect to the Marshall aid, there were great difficulties in getting the 
recipient European countries to cooperate with the donor and among themselves (i.e., opening 
their markets to one another). American objectives for the aid did not always coincide with 
the objectives of the recipient countries, notably in Britain and France. This situation 
required bilateral agreements between the USA, the donor country, and each of the recipient 
nations, and all were conditional. 
In essence, there are two types of foreign assistance, one is financial aid and the other is 
technical advice. The role of financial aid is two-fold: firstly, to make it attractive for a 
country to undertake actions that are known to be difficult for one reason or another -- that 
is, bribing those elements of the population that are reluctant to undertake the changes and 
acquiesce to the new situation, and secondly, to ease the transition. Considerable positive 
evidence has been found for the second point. For example, those countries that had some 
foreign assistance to cushion the compression of imports performed better than those that did 
not have assistance in the right policy context. 
There are also numerous roles for foreign technical advice, and certain things that they should 
not do. Firstly, the foreign advisor can make a valuable intellectual contribution utilizing his 
or her specialized knowledge as well as experiences and judgements about why something has 
succeeded or failed in other countries attempting similar reforms in the past or 
simultaneously. Secondly, foreign advisors can also provide a good house-keeping seal of 
approval on the polices that a country has decided to undertake by making a detached 
judgement -- lending credibility to the actions of a country. Thirdly, depending on the setting 
these advisors can steer the internal dialogue or debate within a nation in a way that possibly 
does not exclude other things but at a minimum includes the things that should be included. 
It is well known that in debates over policy, different groups are looking out for their own 
best interests and there is a high risk that the general interest gets neglected all together. The 
outsiders, who are not perceived to have a personal stake in the domestic outcome, can make 
sure that the main issues are at least addressed; whether the most desirable results are 
achieved will be beyond the foreign advisors control. 
Foreign assistance does not only have to be a simple transfer of resources. It could well be 
a mutually advantageous arrangement between donor and recipient. Foreign assistance can 
create employment and growth in both, particularly when it is conditional and more likely 
when the development and opening of the established markets to the new nations (aid 
recipients) is part of the overall picture. 
Especially in situations where economic transition is associated with a sincere stabilization 
program, foreign assistance does not work when it is back-loaded rather than front-loaded. 
In addition, foreign assistance fails to fulfill its actual objective of helping a recipient in need 
if the aid arrives only then when it is not or no longer needed for the purpose it was to 
originally serve, when it does not serve the purpose of coalition-building, and when it does 
not help to get things started during the time of crisis. The way to build positive momentum 
is to use front-loading, something that is systematically often lacking when giving foreign 
assistance. Additional problems inhibiting the potential success of foreign assistance arise 
when international institutions neglect the crucial tactical and timing aspects of providing aid. 
Usually non-unified governments in chaotic situations and huge factional interests already 
make it difficult for the recipients to justify risky actions of accepting conditional assistance. 
Thus, when these issues are resolved, the international institutions should already have the 
aid ready rather than only begin their selection procedure. A further constraint limiting the 
success and disrupting the schedule of assistance provided is the need for the recipient to 
continue to servicing external debt during the negotiations for aid, a time when the particular 
country (for instance, Poland, Russia, or Bulgaria) is already essentially bankrupt and despite 
the fact that liquidity is necessary to survive. Under private bankruptcy law in the United 
States, all debt servicing is halted (without having to fear any legal repercussions on the part 
of the creditors) immediately at the time a firm files for bankruptcy. Although the 
desirability to apply such conditions in the international economic community seems almost 
unquestionable, guaranteeing the compliance would nonetheless be difficult in the context of 
sovereign nations. 
Bold policies backed by considerable sums of foreign aid have been most successful in 
initiating economic stabilization in troubled nations. Therefore, in order to make foreign aid 
effective and the program successful, recipient countries must do much more than they think 
that they should do and the outside world should lend much more than it thinks it should lend. 
It is this combination of both sides stretching beyond what may be deemed as "politically 
feasible" that leads to real stabilization in real prices. Today, and particularly in Eastern 
Europe, foreign aid can go a long way in helping establish the reform element in a 
government and the West can demonstrate that democracy can indeed work. Foreign aid will 
more likely have a positive effect if there is a willingness on the part of international 
institutions and more well-off nations to provide a substantial up-front investment, putting 
some money at risk, to build a political, social and economic consensus early in the transition 
process. 
The Western aid to Russia over the two years ending in late 1993 was not markedly 
significant and substantial in an economic sense. However, politically it was of paramount 
importance. The pledge to give Russia 24 billion US dollars at the beginning of 1992 was 
one of the crucial factors that helped the Gaidar government survive the Congress of Peoples 
Deputies in April 1992. The fact that the greater part of these pledges did not materialize 
during that yea? was one of the pivotal weapons of the political opposition to reform in 
Russia during the Congress of Peoples Deputies in December 1992, which resulted in the call 
for Gaidar's resignation at the time and a replacement of 30-50% of the highest level 
members of the government. Aid that has been pledged but does not arrive puts the targeted 
recipient governments (in Eastern Europe primarily reformers that can only rely on skeptical 
support at the very most) in a uncomfortable predicament. Furthermore, this puts the 
credibility and integrity of the entire international lending system in jeopardy, particularly 
when the reformist governments have taken on the political risk of introducing various painful 
changes that are prerequisites for obtaining aid. 
The leading international lending institutions were extremely inflexible and slow in providing 
aid when it was most crucially needed in the delicate early stages of reform and transition in 
Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, it took Russia 18 months to 
become a member and receive the first funds from the IMF, though this was not solely the 
Of the aid that finally arrived in 1992: the World Bank ended up only lending 670 million US dollars, which 
was not disbursed until 1993; the IMF at least approved to lend one billion US dollars, but it took until August and 
only on  the condition that the money be held in reserves -- that is, not spent. 
fault of the international lending agency. Countless teams of foreign experts were sent on 
fact finding missions utilizing valuable time and resources of both sides that could be 
implemented in a much more efficient fashion. There is also difficulty for international 
organizations and the West in general to accept proposals from Russia due to the 
incompatibility of terms and definitions of economic factors, not to mention practices and 
accounting. In addition, the international financial institutions favor or neglect recipient 
nations to differing degrees. In this regard, Russia actually has a fairly preferable position. 
The issue becomes more dramatic when recognizing that Russia, previously a major donor 
of assistance to other republics within the FSU, has essentially halted aid to these new states, 
leaving them at the mercy of the slow and cumbersome international aid apparatus. 
Therefore, the possibility of missing further opportunities to help create and support the 
productive coalitions necessary for reform continues to persevere. 
Certainly, political instability was one of the important obstacles to receiving foreign aid in 
Russia. With greater political certainty, a strong commitment to fiscal and monetary reform, 
including strict discipline, should form the appropriate basis for the effective use of foreign 
assistance. Conditionality is seen as important for many reasons, though some suggestions 
have been made to target aid at the project and regional levels to ensure efficiency and 
success, and reduce the possibilities for waste and abuse. Numerous Russian experts believe 
that foreign aid today should form the basis for creating the appropriate economic climate that 
will attract domestic and foreign private investment in the future. 
Debt and Other Issues with respect to the Role of International Organizations 
International decision-making with respect to the foreign debt issue is a good example of the 
degree of efficiency of the international mechanism for aiding or solving financial crisis of 
countries in need. The distribution of a particular Eastern European country's debt is said 
to reflect to a certain extent the dynamics of that country's relations with the West. In the 
Russian case before 1991, for example, the absolute majority of funds were obtained from 
non-official sources as the former Soviet Union (FSU) and its President Gorbachev were 
considered reliable and trustworthy partners by commercial banks. During 1991 this picture 
changed dramatically: commercial banks severely restricted lending and official creditors like 
Germany began to provide substantial funding. While 65% of loans to the FSU were from 
non-official sources pre-1991, over 90% of all borrowed money came from official creditors 
in 1992. 
The cause for Russian debt goes back to Gorbachev policies. From 1988 to 1991, the debt 
rose by 50 billion US dollars and by another 20 billion in 1991 alone. There were numerous 
causes for this drastic expansion including a crucial decline of exports (especially oil), 
acceleration of economic growth was based on expensive import oriented policies (particularly 
of technologies), an unwillingness to restrict the import of consumer products due to political 
pressures, and a sharp decline in export revenue balances due to external and domestic 
borrowing. Thus, when the first Russian government took office in late 1991, there were no 
funds in the accounts to service the exploding debt (only USD 60 million which was equal 
to about 10 hours of imports). 
As a result, immediate negotiations were initiated with the Paris and London Clubs to 
redefine the debt servicing schedule. In fact, the Russian reform team had three main goals: 
to deal with the issue of food credits, to pay as little as possible in financing the debt burden, 
and to attempt to maintain normal political relations with the West and the international 
financial institutions. The two Clubs were indeed wary of their own balance sheets and 
expressed the need for political stability in Russia and the other republics of the FSU and 
Russian economic recovery and growth. Much to the disappointment of the Russian reform 
team, the last of these three terms conditional for lending was most insignificant for the Clubs 
and international institutions. 
Since it is apparent that Eastern European countries (like Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, and 
others) can no longer service their outstanding debt, the international financial institutions and 
the Paris and London Clubs have made multiple agreements with these nations suspending 
and rescheduling principal and interest payments, as well as conceding on the request for total 
debt reduction or debt write-offs. Nevertheless, there are limits to how obliging these 
organizations can be and the debtor nations are generally asking for considerable concessions. 
As in debtor countries, creditor countries also have budgets and budgetary rules. Of course, 
budgetary discipline is at least as important in the creditors countries and one has to 
continually be concerned about its maintenance. 
Real debt relief is very difficult in the existing international framework: it is people making 
decisions with someone else's money. For example, the management of banks do not have 
the money -- they are making decisions on behalf of their stockholders; or, government 
officials who do not have the money -- they are making decisions on behalf of their 
taxpayers. Every time a decision for debt relief is made, someone is giving up an asset or 
having to spend more. It is not easy to transfer debt burdens from one group of countries, 
called debtors, to another group of countries, called creditors, because many of the latter have 
very heavy debt burdens themselves already today. 
In addition, a critical free-rider problem has become almost typical in the international 
lending and rescheduling dialogue. Namely, since the rescheduling negotiations are handled 
seriatim (in a series, one after another) rather than in one common framework, the case arises 
where the commercial banks free-ride on the concessions of the official creditors. 
Furthermore, as the commercial banks see the official creditors expand their concessions, the 
remaining outstanding debt naturally increases in value and the banks, whose share of which 
has consequently increased, are even less willing to concede on their terms. 
One of the most important elements of debt management in the broader sense of the term 
(i.e., external and internal public debt) is the fiscal aspect -- its significance continues to 
increase during the transition to market economies in the East European countries. Two key 
points of the fiscal discussion are the leveling-off or decline of exports since 1991 and the 
increasing fiscal tension due to the social cost of transition and the long delays in 
implementing sweeping changes in fiscal policies. Therefore, the present dynamic of public 
debt accumulation is quite rapid in all these countries. Further issues of concern that threaten 
to cause still greater increases in the public debt are the accumulation of budget deficits and 
the short to medium term prospect of recapitalization of banks, which means that all the non- 
preforming loans to the commercial banks will sooner or later have to be taken over by some 
kind of public funds. 
More broadly then, with this accumulation of both internal and external public debt the whole 
process of transition could fall into some kind of a so-called 'debt-trap'. The room for fiscal 
maneuverability will become even more restricted, making it more difficult to reduce the 
public budget deficit. This situation is inevitably translatable into an enduring crowding-out 
efect on the enterprise sector, especially the private one. Consequently, economies with low 
potential for growth and high vulnerability to foreign shocks are created. 
Examples of countries reaching the critical level of debt burdens are Poland, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Russia. Polish total domestic and foreign debt (that is, all debt that must be 
served from fiscal sources) has already reached close to 85% of GDP in 1993 -- closing in 
on what is considered a catastrophic level -- and servicing the debt will cost at least 4.3 % of 
GDP and that is after a 40% debt reduction negotiated with the London Club. Poland is still 
much better off than a country like Bulgaria where interest payments on total public debt are 
growing and already around 14% of GDP, making up almost all of the nation's budget 
deficit. The Hungarian economy has also been under the shroud of a considerable debt 
burden: in 1990 already, total external debt was closing in on 70% of GDP, total debt 
servicing was almost 15% of GDP, just the interest payments were 5% of GDP and 40% of 
export earnings. In 1991, Gorbachev had to spend 36% of export revenues to service the 
Soviet debt and that was already 10% of GNP at that time. 
For countries in extreme crisis at one time or another during the transition process (like 
Bulgaria, Poland, or Russia), the failure to implement a standstill on debt collections is a 
major systemic fault in the international financing system, particularly if based on economic 
merit. In a precarious time for a country's economy, there should be a way to prevent the 
creditors from making a run on the debtor to get as much as they can before the debtor 
becomes insolvent. There is no established mechanism in place to achieve this in the global 
community because no international bankruptcy proceedings exist. As a result, countries are 
typically forced to pay down their reserves to next to nothing before it is acknowledged that 
they have a payments problem, and then still considerable time elapses before there is a de 
jure settlement. Yet during this time, a nation can be harassed with law suits, it fails in 
procuring working capital, it is not able to get suppliers' credits, and all the other factors 
needed for normal operation. Russia is a case in point: in addition, five days after the new 
government was formed in late 1991, the Western debt collectors turned up in Moscow and 
took up valuable time of the reform team while it was attempting to plan the first phase of 
reform. So, the situation for nations in this type of predicament goes from bad to worse. 
Indeed, the IMF would have the authority to put up a standstill umbrella by certain 
mechanisms allowed in the IMF articles which allow countries to exercise various types of 
exchange control including debt service payments that are then an enforceable barrier against 
other kinds of debtor claims in the courts of the member countries of the IMF. But the Fund 
has not taken such action and it has come at a high cost, especially in the first year or so of 
these crisis situations. 
With respect to the issue of a nation's ability to pay, there are both conceptual and procedural 
problems in the way how the debt is typically managed. The conceptual problem is that 
foreign debt is almost always accumulated loans taken by governments (referred to here as 
official debt) and, therefore, the transfer problem involves both the foreign transfer problem 
and the fiscal problem. As a consequence, the ability to repay a debt becomes a balance of 
payments problem, a burden on the state, and a stabilization problem. As it happens, the 
Paris Club treats this matter almost exclusively as a balance of payments problem, neglecting 
the considerations regarding the fiscal burden of the debt. Thus, an excessive amount of time 
is spent on balance of payments (BOP) projections in these situations despite the 
complications with the BOP concept the way it is calculated to define the ability to pay. 
However, a country will almost always be able to pay the debt if its government is prepared 
to squeeze imports enough; but, there is no accepted normative scale as to how much import 
compression is enough or too much. 
However, there are arguments that defend the reasoning of the Paris Club to base lending on 
BOP rather than link it to fiscal issues. Some experts will testify that fiscal problems, above 
all, are the responsibility of citizens of that particular country. The international community 
should not have much to say about them, one way or the other, unless they have an impact 
on international relations; that is, on international transactions. The Paris Club was never 
set up to deal with all the economic problems of the debtor country. The Club was created 
to provide temporary relief on a particular crucial fund, not to provide a comprehensive 
solution. The Paris Club is the wrong forum for dealing with the kind of comprehensive 
approach needed to resolve the fiscal difficulties of all the countries coming forward for 
foreign assistance. 
Although debt is directly and intrinsically a part of the fiscal problem as well as the BOP 
problem in the Eastern European countries in transition, there are many other sources of the 
fiscal problem. In fact, the other sources of the fiscal problem are usually a large multiple 
of the debt share. Internationally, it is the role of the IMF, among all multilateral financial 
institutions, to take the whole spectrum of economic issues and criteria into account that will 
determine the necessary stability which is a desirable goal and often a prerequisite for foreign 
aid. 
Possibly due to this extensive assignment in which delays are certainly not unheard of, the 
IMF is frequently blamed for not providing timely aid. However, some experts indicate that 
immediate aid for economic fine-tuning and emergencies is essentially only appropriate when 
the economic fundamentals in the recipient country are sufficiently well-evolved, stable, and 
meeting some set standards and prerequisites. As this has generally not been the case during 
the early phases of reform in the East European nations and those in the FSU in particular, 
there should be more understanding for the IMF's procedure and timing. Besides, 
considerable resources are at stake for the creditors of the IMF so there is no room for 
impulsive decisions and, at any rate, the IMF is not here, and never was, to provide money 
on demand. 
The World Bank (WB) has also had a very important role, though its influence has sometimes 
been two-sided and resulting in criticism. On the positive side, the World Bank has worked 
well in providing technical assistance for the privatization process in, say, Russia. However, 
on the more perplexing side, there is a systemic feature of Bank policy -- the import 
rehabilitation loans for all of the countries of the FSU. Rather than having this be general 
balance of payments support to back the market exchange rate or to promote the free market 
for foreign exchange, the World Bank has instead pushed for a very bureaucratic structure 
of Gosplan-style import targeting. The problem with this procedure is that when such 
institutions do not exist in some of the recipient countries, they are created. In countries like 
Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan, both of which are beneficiaries of WB import rehabilitation loans, 
the Bank has only allowed one-third to be dispersed through the free market, while two-thirds 
had to go for "idemj7ed impon nee&". In order to identify these needs, the Bank 
established an agency which consequently controlled about 50% of the recorded import 
licensing in each country by late 1993. The World Bank states that its role is not to loan 
money to the enterprises: in fact, the enterprises must use local currency to buy the foreign 
exchange. Yet, this entire program can be seen as an example that is completely opposite 
to the philosophy of the reform. 
The countries of Eastern Europe were, in fact, not in mind when the rules for international 
financial agencies were drafted. The rules were laid down for ordinary market-oriented 
countries that got themselves in some financial difficulty for either internal or external reasons 
resulting in the need for more capital. The rules were not conceived to deal with nations 
undergoing the colossal and extraordinary task of massive economic reform. The Paris Club, 
the IMF, and others should in fact only be considered as only a small part of managing this 
special process, while what is required is a framework to take an overview of the whole 
process. Unfortunately, this is still absent. The countries of Eastern Europe present an entire 
new set of problems that might actually require an adaptation of the established rules in most 
of the international agencies. However, this may not be favorable and it may be more 
desirable still, to develop a new special set of rules for these situations. Eastern Europe 
presents a situation unlike those customarily dealt with by the international funding institutions 
in places like Columbia, Nigeria, Chile, and so forth. 
There is an inherent paradox in how an international system providing foreign assistance 
should operate: on the one hand, it should be demand driven and fast disbursing, and, on the 
other, it should be cost effective and not corrupt. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear 
that the role of international organizations is certainly not an easy one. The whole activity 
of international organizations providing foreign assistance to the East European countries in 
their unprecedented transition efforts, radically reforming previously centrally planned into 
market economies in very short time frames, has thus far been characterized by a sort of 
learning period for both sides. 
Some Eastern European government officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the treatment 
of certain issues by the international organizations, in particular the IMF. The complaints 
include such points that the approach of the Fund in Hungary, for example, has recently 
focussed too narrowly on finding ways to cut budget deficit and expenditure, neglecting such 
issues as supporting a fixed exchange rate as, for example, a nominal anchor. This distracted 
from the need to undertake many other moves that were crucial to continuing the overall 
reform efforts. In fact, there appears to be a real omission of qualitative targets and an 
obsession with quantitative targets. 
Over the years and founded on their respective guidelines, a type of division of labor between 
certain international organizations, like the IMF and the World Bank, has evolved. The 
World Bank seems to be more preoccupied with structural reforms while the IMF is more 
concerned with macroeconomic reforms. This division has developed some flaws and 
resulted in inconsistencies. The concentration of one organization or another on the need of 
the recipient country to fulfill a particular measure (i.e., like the IMF on the budget deficit) 
has frequently caused recipient nation authorities to feel pressured into following a policy path 
that they may actually perceive as not the most appropriate means conducive to a successful 
end. Also, the procedure to determine eligibility for and amount of foreign aid available to 
a potential recipient country based on economic forecasts made with uncertain data in an 
economic environment where the underlying behavior and determinant factors are changing 
incredibly rapidly, widely, and often unpredictably, necessitates the donor or creditor to be 
very flexible on the conditionality and targets tied to the aid. Yet, exactly those international 
organizations that use economic forecasts, have been very rigid with respect to their terms 
and timing of the aid they have given directly or managed in some other manner. 
International assistance organizations have many people working on Russia and Eastern 
Europe but too few on site. There is a need to set up more in the way of permanent 
missions, though the international organizations argue availability of experts is more 
important than continuous residence of experts (more details in the next section). In order 
to achieve their goal of aiding countries with economic difficulties that impede future growth, 
lead to social hardship, and eventually to political collapse, the international organizations 
must clarify their internal priorities. Fact finding missions are useful, but must be efficient. 
More should be done with resident experts, giving them greater freedoms and responsibilities. 
Greater consistency on the one hand, and increased cognizance, sensitivity, and sympathy for 
differences on the other, as well as higher flexibility are all characteristics that could use 
improvement in the international aid framework. Considerable care is required in applying 
a particular recipe-type solution, not to mention stereo-typing nations, regions, or situations. 
Only after sufficient on-site effort to understand the situation, problems, measures and 
instruments used to deal with them, and the differences to customary and traditional practices 
and definitions common in long-established Western industrialized market economies, will 
the aid giving process become more effective and timely, not to mention more accepted by 
the recipient populations. 
Technical Assistance and Policy Advice: The Role of International Agencies (including 
associated organizations), Academic Advisors, and Consultants 
Certain fundamental characteristics of a recipient government and its ways have been 
identified by practitioners on both sides to, by and large, be the major determinants of the 
effective use and success of foreign technical assistance and policy advice in achieving at least 
the expectations set ex-ante. That is to say, as long as the assistance and advice is, of course, 
of sound quality in its own right. 
The recipient government must specifically express the need for foreign help -- it must be the 
initiator. It is unacceptable for the process of providing foreign assistance that the demand 
is just an alibi to appease the international aid-giving organizations or the domestic 
population. The recipient government should not only clarify what assistance is desired and 
how it should be transmitted to be best received, but should also be undisputedly determined 
and politically willing to implement the results of cooperation. In this way, the sincere effort 
on behalf of both parties will not be in vain, and there should be no dramatic surprises for 
either side. 
A further key technical and organizational factor is the need for foreign advisors to be 
permitted to participate in the normal everyday work of the recipient country's executive staff 
and experts. Even in response to a request, it is unfortunately not always easy to give 
assistance for lack of access to the critical departments (i.e., invitations into ministries, etc.), 
insufficient time and exchanges with decision-makers of influence and knowledgeability, and 
inadequate or incomplete information. Technical support of foreign advisors is also on the 
list of pivotal points for ensuring the relevance and subsequent success of advice and 
assistance. Also, seniority and authority of the domestic counterparts to the foreigners in the 
recipient country is crucial to the success of aid programs (i.e., their ability to be involved 
in program design rather than simply in reporting functions). The M F ,  for example, does 
not operate without an invitation from the recipient government. Thus, there are limitations 
on the Fund's ability to place talent and react to perceived potential needs. 
The role and visibility of the foreign advisor can be extremely beneficial for the recipient 
government as long as there is no abuse. For the sake of public acceptance, it will be more 
beneficial if the advisor works behind the scenes rather than spreading views in an aggressive 
public relations campaign. Particularly in the countries of Eastern Europe, the people are 
leery about foreign meddling in domestic policy. Once the advisors have arrived, the resident 
experts and decision-makers must make a point of working with them and making the 
investment payoff in a mutually beneficial manner. It will be counterproductive for both the 
host country and the foreign advisor should this person, group, or organization be used as an 
instrument of political maneuvering between domestic parties concerning political disputes. 
The advisory body should only be used in its designated professional capacity. This is 
important for the integrity of the entire assistance process. 
Most Eastern European policy-makers agree that full-time, resident foreign advisors are the 
most productive. Regular part-time foreign advisors (i.e., one visit for several days each 
month) with resident assistants and consequently still permanent access to necessary data and 
other information are a second-best solution. The experts offering their assistance should 
certainly have some previous general knowledge regarding the host country's culture, history, 
ethnic composition, and the recent political and economic situation in order to be most 
effective in their set task. To this end, there is obviously great value in taking the time and 
making the effort to conduct a detailed and in depth diagnosis of the situation in the recipient 
nation. This can be seen as a sort of insurance for the applicability and relevance of the 
foreign expert's advice. 
Occasional expert visits with little advance preparation have rarely proven to be significantly 
useful; in fact, more often than not these were deleterious, especially considering the time and 
money they consumed. Too much of the little valuable time available is used to instruct 
foreigners on basic characteristics of the host country; so, essentially no discussion 
concerning specific important policy issues occurs. However, it is important to make a 
distinction between the foreign experts involved in the aid process for the sake of providing 
assistance and those involved to monitor how the aid provided is used. The responsibility of 
the latter group is to help the tax-payer in the donor country or the nation holding a stake in 
the particular multilateral financial institution to control whether all the conditions tied to the 
aid are met and not abused by the recipient country. They are also there to report and review 
the conditions determining the eligibility of a recipient country for aid. The premier objective 
of these experts is not to go there in order to provide assistance and they should not be 
expected to do so. 
Although theoretical knowledge is an important part of any expert's professional skills, 
practical experience in the art of policy-making or policy-advising can significantly enhance 
a foreign advisor's productivity and ability to engage in amiable collaboration. The effect 
of an advisor will be further enhanced should this person or group be able to conduct their 
assisting activities in the domestic language, reducing the transaction costs, frictional costs 
and misunderstandings. Yet, even if an advisor possesses such favorable traits which allow 
him to get intimately close to the action (i.e., as far as taking an active part in elaborating 
government programs, drafting legislation and budgets, etc.), he, she or they must clearly 
refrain from acting as a decision-maker in the applied sense. This role is reserved for the 
domestic politicians and civil servants whom the advisors are providing with their services. 
As a consequence, the policy finally introduced by the recipient government may well differ 
from the advisors original proposals, and as long as this does not conflict with any 
conditionality requirements tied to donated funds, such decisions can only be accepted by the 
foreign advisors. Simultaneously, the recipient nation must then avoid making the advisors 
scapegoats for any policy failures. 
Technical assistance is, in fact, more than just policy advice at the highest political level. 
Technical assistance is a broader concept and exists in many forms including: awareness 
creation (regarding investment technologies, business practices, functioning of a market 
economy, or the public sector or government ministry in a market environment); human 
resource development (training, development, placement, and so forth); policy formulation 
(i.e., guidelines for cooperation between industrial organizations and/or chambers of 
commerce and political decision-makers on issues of institution-building, sub-contracting, 
investment promotion, etc.); and direct support at the enterprise level. As economic 
transition towards a more market system progresses, a shift in the type of technical assistance 
can be expected, most probably from the macro to the enterprise level. 
The results of a recent conference organized by the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) revealed various key areas requiring technical assistance in the 
transforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the policy level assistance is 
required on the conceptualization and design of policy (including industrial restructuring, 
privatization, and investment), the creation of the necessary institutional infrastructure for 
executing the policies (encompassing everything from organization of market information to 
publiclprivate sector coordination and promotion of the private sector), the integration of 
environmental aspects into industrial policy, and the development and extension of a wide 
range of training programs. Further assistance at the enterprise level should focus on 
financial, production, operations, and physical restructuring, programs for conversion of 
military to civilian production, promotion of domestic and foreign investment, identification 
of and penetration techniques for export markets, provision of appropriate technologies, and 
training programs in market-based management techniques and tools. Each of the many aid 
agencies and international financial institutions like the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, OECD, 
CEC, UN, UNIDO, International Labor Organization, UNCTAD, UNEP, WHO, and others 
could concentrate their assistance in their special area of expertise. 
Competition between foreign advisors or advising organizations may easily lead to confusion, 
withholding of information on the part of the advisors to maintain some of their monopoly 
position in providing policy advice, and a severe lack of communication undermining the 
purpose of the assistance-giving process, reducing the productivity of international 
cooperation, and eventually creating distrust on the part of the recipients. Coordination and 
openness between the agents providing the help is critical to the success of aid, as is the 
speedy response to requests from the recipient countries. Both these issues are improved with 
the permanent presence of a resident base of advisors and assistants in the nation in need. 
Foreign aid can exert two main influences on the recipient country. The conditions of aid 
provide incentive to induce change, and the aid itself acts as a shock-absorber to cushion the 
social impact of reforms. Once the decision to aid has been taken, it is important to have a 
coalition of economic experts and technocrats from both donor and recipient countries to work 
closely together to decide on policy. Knowledge, information, coordination, speed, 
willingness, and openness on both sides of the aid, as well as more decentralized decision- 
making on the part of the multilateral organizations will determine the measure of success. 
In future, more care should be taken by the donors of categorizing the types of recipients 
(i.e., Russia should not be considered within the same framework as Nigeria, Chile and 
others) and the guidelines, conditions, regulations, and flexibility governing the provision of 
aid must be altered to better reflect and thus accommodate the changing situation in national 
economies throughout the world, more specifically the transforming economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Personal and written exchange are compliments in setting the stage for 
foreign assistance. Productive two-way communication is the essential prerequisite and basis 
for aid negotiations and disbursion. 
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